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1.1  Introduction 
The application of  economics principles to the behavior of  colleges and 
universities is a topic of substantial interest and importance. The literature on 
various aspects of  the economics of  higher education is large and growing 
rapidly.  The resources commanded by  all institutions of  higher learning are 
large. In 1989 the aggregate expenditures of all two- and four-year undergrad- 
uate colleges and postgraduate institutions came to $131.4 billion. For pur- 
poses of comparison, this sum exceeded the sales of any three-digit manufac- 
turing industry except petroleum refining and motor vehicles and of any three- 
digit service industry except hospitals. 
Much of the application of economics principles to university behavior has 
focused on cost measurements and allocation issues. Surprisingly, there has 
been little attention given to the questions concerning the marketplace context 
of universities: how they compete for faculty (“inputs”), how they “position” 
themselves in  the marketplace, how  they decide on “prices” (tuition, room 
and board charges for resident students, etc.), how they decide on production 
levels (the number of  students to admit), when to enter new  markets (e.g., 
offering  new  programs or degrees, establishing new  professional schools), 
and so on. Though a few authors briefly mention “competition” among uni- 
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versities (e.g., Bok 1990, 104; Bowen 1980; Garvin 1980), none has analyzed 
this competitive process or made serious estimates of relevant parameters. 
We believe that this absence of apparent interest in the market context may 
undermine-or,  at a minimum, mask some crucial assumptions in-the  cost 
or allocation analyses undertaken by some authors. For example, the “auton- 
omous cost increase” model of Massy (1  989) has embedded in it an implicit 
assumption that every university is a separate monopoly that faces an inelastic 
demand and that can raise its prices at will to cover all cost increases. Perhaps 
this is indeed the case; but if so, an unaddressed issue in the Massy analysis is 
the question of why universities have been so slow to raise their prices and 
revenues and thereby raise their expenditures. In any event, an explicit state- 
ment of this assumption would make clearer the basis for the Massy analysis. 
At the opposite extreme, the allocation analyses of James (1978, 1986) and 
James and Neuberger (1981) assume that tuition prices are predetermined and 
beyond the control  of  the individual  institution.  Should we be comfortable 
with that basis for analysis? 
As yet  a third  example, we note that  a number of  the authors providing 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand for higher education seem uninter- 
ested in whether they are measuring the price elasticity for higher education 
in aggregate or the cross-elasticity of some institutions vis-h-vis others.2  Only 
researchers who were uninterested  in market contexts would fail to be inter- 
ested in the distinction. 
We believe that the market context of higher education-whether  universi- 
ties compete, how they compete, and the consequences of  that competition 
for university input, production, pricing, and output decisions-is  interesting 
in its own right and important for understanding the cost and allocation issues 
that have concerned most researchers.  This paper cannot possibly  answer all 
of the relevant questions concerning competition among universities. But we 
hope to deal with some of them and raise important questions and puzzles for 
others to pursue. Indeed we hope to provoke and challenge at least as much as 
we analyze and explain. 
In section 1.2  we address an allocation issue that has been raised by others 
(e.g., James 1978, 1986): Is there “cross-subsidy” among a typical universi- 
ty’s activities and specifically between undergraduate and graduate teaching? 
We introduce the “stand-alone test” of Faulhaber (1975) to show that the pre- 
vious claims of substantial cross-subsidy do not rest on a solid analytical foun- 
dation. 
Section  1.3  analyzes issues of student quality and diversity in a university 
and their consequences for output and pricing.  Suppose the mix of students 
affects the efficiency of teaching (e.g., for any average level of learning ability 
by students,  the necessity for repetition or remedial effort will be less when 
the variance  of  learning  abilities is less) or the quality of output (e.g., stu- 
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dents’ learning is enhanced by having fellow students with a diversity of back- 
grounds). An efficient university  admissions policy would be to encourage a 
large pool of applicants (e.g., through apparent “underpricing”) and then to 
accept students selectively and to price selectively (i.e., to practice price dis- 
crimination through  selective scholarships) so as to achieve the efficiencies 
that accompany the mix and diversity characteristics. Simple market-clearing 
prices  would  not be  as likely to achieve these efficiencies.  In essence,  the 
incoming students themselves are an important input to (and affect the effi- 
ciency of production of) the educational services output of the university, and 
the university’s admission and pricing policies are likely to reflect this special 
relationship between input and outp~t.~ 
Section 1.4 addresses some of the broader pricing, market, and competition 
questions.  After  noting that  the  preferences  of  the  providers of  nontuition 
funds must be a part of the analysis of university behavior, we first examine 
some questions concerning input behavior (e.g., why are research universities 
reluctant to reward teaching performance?) and then largely focus on output 
pricing and market behavior: For example, why do universities pass up appar- 
ent opportunities  to practice  revenue-increasing  price  discrimination? Why 
do universities  generally change uniform tuition levels across different fields 
that appear to have substantially different marginal costs? Why do universities 
fail to price so as to capture the rents that attach to their brand-name reputa- 
tions? What motivates entry and exit among universities? For most of  these 
(and other) questions, we can offer insights and clarifications, but many basic 
puzzles remain. 
Section 1.5 offers a brief conclusion. 
1.2  The Criteria for Cross-Subsidization 
The observation that in the modem research university, undergraduate edu- 
cation subsidizes  graduate education and research  is commonplace.  Estelle 
James (1978, 1986, 1990) has been the most prominent and consistent pro- 
ponent of this view. It is based on an analytic model of the goals of the univer- 
sity set down most precisely in a joint article with Egon Neuberger (James and 
Neuberger 1981). 
The simplest version of their argument runs as follows: Suppose that a uni- 
versity department’s only revenue comes from teaching  undergraduates  and 
that its only expense is buying (at the market price) faculty time. Faculty time 
may be allocated either to teaching undergraduates or to research. The depart- 
ment maximizes a utility function in which research is an argument subject to 
the constraint that expenditures may not exceed revenue.  If any faculty time 
is spent doing research, then James would argue that undergraduate education 
3. We can also draw the parallel here with the hiring policies of  some companies that offer 
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is subsidizing research because  undergraduate education  produces revenues 
while research does not. A more sophisticated version of the argument allows 
the faculty to care about the quality (but not the quantity) of  undergraduate 
education and  allows for revenue  from graduate students and research,  but 
reaches the same conclusion because large undergraduate courses can be used 
to bring in revenue so that faculty can do more research. It is this sophisticated 
version of  the argument that James takes as embodying cross-subsidization; 
“profits” from undergraduates subsidize graduate education and research that 
“usually do not bring in enough revenues to cover their costs” (1986, 237). 
One of  the predictions of  James’s model is that universities  will produce 
undergraduate education with a different technology than institutions that do 
not have graduate students and that do not do research. Liberal arts colleges 
and community colleges have smaller classes on average than research univer- 
sities and do not use graduate students as teachers. Because the former tech- 
nology  is cheaper than the latter,  undergraduates  subsidize graduate educa- 
tion. 
James (1986) argues that consideration of  the cross-subsidy  issue should 
make one reconsider arguments about the effects of  state educational policy 
on the distribution of  income. Hansen  and Weisbrod (1969) argued that the 
California system of  public education subsidizes higher-income residents of 
that state, since the latter’s children tend to go to institutions (universities) at 
which the cost per pupil is higher than at the institutions (state and community 
colleges) to which the poor send their children. By James’s reckoning, this is 
incorrect because the real cost of providing undergraduate education in a uni- 
versity is rather low. 
Intuitively,  there seems to be  something wrong with the James argument 
because, unlike the privilege of sleeping under the bridges of Pans, admission 
to the  University  of  California is restricted.  Because there  is evidence that 
consumers will pay more to attend universities than to attend community col- 
leges, attendance at the former institutions must be worth more than enroll- 
ment at the latter. This observation is, in essence, the basis for our belief that 
undergraduate education does not subsidize graduate education and research. 
Undergraduate education  is produced  as both  a joint  product with graduate 
education (in research universities) and, at the same time, the only product of 
some firms in the education business-particularly  liberal arts colleges and 
community colleges. Thus, undergraduate education produced as a joint prod- 
uct survives in a competitive market with undergraduate education produced 
as a sole product. The modem definition of cross-subsidization takes this fact 
as evidence that graduate education and research are not subsidized by under- 
graduate education. 
A concise statement of the modern definition of cross-subsidization  for the 
multiproduct firm is due to Faulhaber (1975). It is a sophisticated  version of 
the  stand-alone test. Suppose a firm  produces goods that  serve N  different 
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an element of  cross-subsidy.  According to Faulhaber, they do if it is possible 
for another firm to serve a subset of these customers and make a profit. The 
entering firm, of  course, can only serve this subset of  customers if these cus- 
tomers choose to be customers of the entrant rather than the incumbent-that 
is, if the entrant offers a more attractive price and quality combination. 
In symbols, let S  = {1,2, . . . ,  N};  then if y  C  RN  produces revenue ~(y), 
there is no cross-subsidization if for all subsets TcS, C(y3 2 r(y3,  where 
and C(  y’)  is the cost of producing yT. 
The application to education  is immediate. Suppose that the three classes 
of  consumers are  undergraduates, graduates,  and  consumers of  research. 
Then the fact that firms in the education industry that serve all three kinds of 
consumers survive in competition with firms that serve only one kind of cus- 
tomer  is  a  demonstration  that  undergraduate  education  does  not  cross- 
subsidize graduate education and research. 
Two arguments against this position must be considered. The first rests on 
the observation that the undergraduate  education  students get from a liberal 
arts college is different from the undergraduate  education  that students at a 
“multiversity” (Kerr 1964) receive. As we have observed, James states that a 
confirmed prediction of her theory is the fact that undergraduate colleges will 
have  smaller  class sizes than research  universities.  However,  this seems to 
miss the point. Harvard and Swarthmore compete for the same students; so do 
UCLA and the Claremont colleges. Large research universities have  larger 
classes than liberal arts colleges, but the different variants of  the product sur- 
vive in competition; Fords are different from Chevys, but both brands compete 
for the same customers. 
Another objection is the observation that the zero-profit constraint is inap- 
propriate  for institutions  of  higher education.  This has considerable  force. 
Certainly it is a bit difficult to state precisely the yearly budget constraint of  a 
private nonprofit institution with a large endowment that receives many char- 
itable contributions  (some from alumni, which  might be  considered  as de- 
ferred payments of tuition) and sells research to many governmental agencies. 
Equally  murky  is the budget  constraint  of  a public university that  receives 
capitation fees for some students, sells research to governments,  has an en- 
dowment, and can call on the state to fund its buildings with various kinds of 
bonds.  However, it remains true that institutions of higher education do face 
some kind of  long-run  budget  constraint. These constraints clearly  involve 
subsidies. Within this complex system of subsidies, institutions that sell both 
graduate and undergraduate education survive in competition with institutions 
that sell only undergraduate education. 
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institutions that produce only graduate education and/or research  are rare  .4 
Even if they did not exist at all, it would, we think, be incorrect to conclude 
that undergraduate education in the large research university subsidizes grad- 
uate education.  Although  we can only offer partial e~idence,~  it is clear that 
there are economies of scope in higher education.  Being part of  a research 
university confers considerable benefits to undergraduates, benefits for which 
they  are willing  to pay both  in money and in the acceptance of  what  some 
deem a poorer educational technology-larger  classes and graduate student 
instructors. Some of the sources of these economies are obvious: library and 
computer facilities,  the possibility  of  contact with the latest research,  sheer 
size, and diversity; doubtless there are many others. Undergraduates and their 
parents value these things. 
1.3  Admissions Policies: Selectivity and Pricing 
Prices ration access to many goods in our society. A conspicuous exception 
is the right to attend the best institutions of higher education. Cost considera- 
tions do affect where and whether people go to college. However, by  defini- 
tion, select colleges and universities receive more applications than they can 
accept; many  public colleges and universities  will only admit students who 
achieve a particular academic standard. Why should this be so? The obvious 
answer is that it is not fair (in some sense) to let people buy their way into the 
best universities; access ought to be based on merit.‘j However, since in most 
other arenas the price system is an efficient way of allocating resources, it is 
interesting to examine whether or not the price system could in principle lead 
to an efficient allocation of students to different institutions of higher educa- 
tion. 
1.3.1  The General Problem 
Suppose  there  are  sets S = {1,2, . . . , N} of  students  and  C = {1,2, 
. . . ,  T}  of colleges. An allocation A is an assignment of students to colleges, 
a mapping from S to C. Since one of the “colleges”  in C can represent  not 
going to college at all, the formulation is general. Under the allocation A,  A(S) 
is the college that student S attends. We summarize the benefit a student gets 
from a college in a single number W,[A(S)].  W,[A(S)]  is a net benefit; the real 
costs of attending college (mostly forgone earnings) are included; the price, 
or tuition, that the college charges is excluded. The subscript A indicates that 
4.  RAND, the Salk Institute, the Institute for Advanced Study, and Rockefeller University are 
examples. It is our casual impression that these institutions have somewhat more difficulty provid- 
ing a steady flow of funds for their researchers than do institutions that produce undergraduate 
education as well as research and graduate education. 
5.  The cost functions estimated by Cohn, Rhine, and Santos (1989) indicate significant econo- 
mies of scope in universities. 
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benefits depend not only on the college attended but also on the complete 
allocation of students to colleges. The total surplus of an allocation A is just 
B(A) = C;=,  W,[A(S)].  An allocation is efficient if B(A) 2  B(A’)  for all allo- 
cations A ’  . 
Allocations differ in efficiency only if  there is some synergy. If  the costs 
that a college incurs are the same for all students and  if  attendance at that 
college increases a student’s human capital by the same amount regardless of 
the ability or composition of the student body,  then the specific identities of 
the students who attend that college are irrelevant. If  all colleges are like this, 
then all allocations are efficient. For allocations to have different efficiencies, 
it must be the case that students get different benefits from attending different 
colleges and that colleges’ net contribution to their students depends on the 
students themselves. We can only have a concern for the efficiency of different 
allocations if students themselves are an important input into the educational 
process. If students are inputs in this sense, then there are externalities in the 
higher education industry. 
A large and beautiful literature focuses on matching problems of this sort. 
The phenomena of  college admissions motivated much of  the work in  this 
area. In  fact, the title of  the seminal paper is “College Admissions and the 
Stability of Marriage” (Gale and Shapley 1962). 
Unfortunately the line of research that Gale and Shapley initiated can deal 
easily with only a restricted set of externalities. Perhaps the most convincing 
demonstration of the relevance of sophisticated game theory to real economic 
decisions is Roth’s (1984) study of the matching problem for medical interns. 
Briefly, Roth showed that the procedure (called the National Intern Matching 
Program, or NIMP) used since the early 1950s to assign interns to hospitals 
worked because it produced stable allocations in the following sense: given 
the allocation produced by the NIMP, there did not exist a hospital or an intern 
not matched by the NIMP such that the intern preferred to be matched to the 
hospital and the hospital preferred the intern to an intern assigned to the hos- 
pital by the NIMP. The NIMP was stable because no hospital and intern could 
both improve their situation by defecting from the NIMP. This abstract result 
goes a long way to explain the remarkable success and stability of the entirely 
voluntary NIMP. 
The proof that the NIMP produces stable allocations assumes that the pref- 
erences of hospitals for groups of interns and of interns for hospitals are very 
simple. Interns are assumed to have preferences only about hospitals and not 
to care about who their fellow interns are. Hospital preferences concerning 
groups of  interns have a property called responsiveness, which means that 
they could be derived from a simple ranking of interns and are essentially free 
of  compositional effects.  Absent  these restrictions, the  NIMP may  not  be 
stable; worse still, stable matchings may not exist. Again, this abstract result 
has empirical bite. If interns may marry one another and if they want to work 
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married interns to the same hospital, or at least to hospitals in the same city), 
then stable allocations may not exist. The medical community noted that de- 
fections from NIMP started occurring in large numbers when increasing num- 
bers of interns were married to one another. The matching literature has gen- 
erally  produced  results  that  state  that  its  most  powerful  and  positive 
conclusions may not apply when people care about whom they are matched 
with. Those who have studied the college admissions problem have relatively 
little to say when students care who their classmates are and when colleges 
explicitly desire some sort of diversity. 
Roth’s analysis  of  the  intern market had  no place  for prices.  Kelso  and 
Crawford (1982) showed that this was not an inherent limitation of the match- 
ing literature. Their very general model shows how competitive prices can be 
made an important part of the matching process. However, their analysis does 
not apply if colleges have explicit preferences about the composition of their 
student body or if students care about the identities of their fellow classmates.’ 
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) provide a lucid review of this research. 
Our general  question  is  whether or not  the  price  system will  lead to an 
efficient allocation. We start with a trivial observation. Any allocation can be 
supported by a price system. A price system is just a listing of the prices that 
colleges charge students; that is, a price system is given by specifying p(c,s), 
the price that college c charges student s. If 
xs  if A(s) = c 
~0 if A(s)  # c’  = [ 
where  xs 5  m,  then  pA(c,s)  implements  A. This price  system  may  seem 
strange; yet it is in some respects close to the system that some colleges use. 
A denial of admission is the same as a price of a.  We do not generally think 
of price systems as being so personalized.  However, scholarships determine 
the net prices that students pay for colleges, and these scholarships depend on 
a great many personal characteristics. What is perhaps most strange about the 
price system equation (1) is that it is not competitive; colleges must collude to 
implement it. 
1.3.2  Benefits of Homogeneity 
It is hard  to teach a class when the  students differ greatly  in  ability  and 
background. We might surmise that an efficient allocation of students to col- 
leges would group students of the  same ability. Suppose the benefits that a 
7. If the preferences reduce to money, then the general results apply. That is, if students care 
only about how much human capital their school gives them and if they recognize that this is 
affected by  whom they meet in school, everything works. If, however, students care about both 
money and about who their classmates are, then stable allocations may not exist. This is true even 
if students can put a price on good fellowship. Similarly, if colleges care about the composition of 
the student body-a  preference for diversity-as  well as its efficiency in producing human capi- 
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college conferred on its students were an increasing function of average ability 
of  the student body and a decreasing function of the variance of ability. An 
efficient price system would necessarily  group students of  similar ability to- 
gether. It is natural to ask whether a price system can accomplish this. 
If prices at each college are based on a student’s ability, the signaling mod- 
els of  Spence (1974) and  others can be  brought to bear.  In those  models, 
people differ in some characteristic t. People can purchase differing amounts 
of a commodity g; here g denotes the amount of the commodity that people 
buy. The surplus from a t person’s consuming g is W(g,t).  However, the per- 
son  must  pay  a  price  p(g,t), so  the  net  benefit  that  accrues  is  just 
w(g,t) = W(g,r) -  p(g,t).  In  such  a  situation,  a person  of  ability  t  will 
choose g(t)  to maximize w(  g,t). Under mild conditions on w(  g,t),  g(t) will be 
an  increasing  function  of  t; people  with  different  skills consume  different 
amounts of g. In the original signaling literature, g was taken to be years of 
schooling, but the structure of the argument does not depend on this interpre- 
tation. It is easy to devise a price system that will segregate people of different 
ability levels. 
Two problems with such a price system must be mentioned. First, people 
differ  in many characteristics, perhaps most importantly in liquidity or wealth. 
If capital markets are imperfect,  then potential  students may not be able to 
purchase the education that maximizes the present discounted value of future 
consumption.  Second, if  the benefit that a college education confers on its 
graduates depends on the mix of abilities of those graduates and if  each col- 
lege sets p(c,s)  to compete for students, then the structure of the model is the 
same as the model of competition among insurance companies for customers 
that Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) have analyzed.  Such 
markets may lack equilibria-or  at least the most obvious kinds of  equilibria 
do not exist. 
1.3.3  Benefits of Diversity 
It is sometimes argued that a diverse student body is desirable. A competi- 
tive price system will  achieve diversity only with difficulty or by  accident. 
The prices that companies charge can in some cases depend on the observable 
characteristics of customers. They cannot depend simply on the identification 
of customers. However, without such prices it is not possible to achieve diver- 
sity. 
Consider a very simple model. Suppose that four people are to be allocated 
among two colleges. Each college has a capacity of two students. We model 
the desire for diversity by presuming that students are risk averse and that the 
students of  a given  college  share equally in the college’s output, which  is 
simply the sum of the random inputs of its students. There are two kinds of 
students.  The input of students x, and x2 is the random variable 2,  and the 
input of students y, and y2 is the random variable j;  f and 9 are independent, 
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Clearly, the optimal allocation sends one xi  and one yi  to each college. An 
anonymous  price  system-that  is,  one that  ignores  a  person’s  observable 
characteristics-could  not  accomplish  this  result.  This  is  clearly  a  small- 
numbers problem; if a college admits a large number of students, then the law 
of large numbers indicates that each college should be able to achieve approx- 
imately the right mix of  students.  Similarly, an insurance company expects 
that its customers’ risks are uncorrelated. 
Since the law of  large numbers does require large numbers to work, col- 
leges may  feel that using a competitive price system (one in which  supply 
equals demand) would leave them with less control over the composition of 
the student body than they  would like. Do colleges use the excess demand, 
which their less-than-market clearing prices generate, to make efficient allo- 
cations? We  do not know; and given the difficulty of  assessing the effects of 
matching  in our economy,* we doubt that it is easily  knowable.  Still, it  is 
important to understand the weakness in the a priori argument that competi- 
tion will allocate students to colleges efficiently. 
1.4  Markets and Competition 
In this  section, we address directly the question concerning the  markets 
within  which universities operate and the nature of  the competition among 
universities.  More often than not, as will be clear, we can only offer insights 
and raise questions and puzzles. 
1.4.1 
The standard economic model of anything is to assume it maximizes some- 
thing subject to a resource constraint. This paradigm is hard to apply to higher 
education because it is difficult to state what is being maximized or what the 
resource constraint is. It is unclear who “the university” is, so it is not obvious 
who (or what) is doing the maximizing. This makes it difficult to state what is 
being maximized. The theory of the firm (in the absence of complete markets 
or perfect certainty) faces the same difficulty, but it is not difficult (in prin- 
ciple) to describe the different interests and prerogatives of the important ac- 
tors (management, shareholders, and employees). 
The goals of some members of the university community (faculty and stu- 
dents) are perhaps not too difficult to model, but the motivations of others (in 
particular,  senior administrators, regents, and trustees) resist easy characteri- 
zation. It is even harder to specify the prerogatives and bargaining power of 
the different constituents of the  university. Faculty  like to say (and to hear 
administrators say) that the faculty is the university. However, faculty often 
disagree among themselves. Biologists and historians may have very different 
The Nature of the Enterprise 
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views of the nature of the university and its goals and problems. Administra- 
tors and trustees make important decisions about how the university is to run 
(and who is going to run it). 
Although institutions of higher education do face resource constraints (and 
as we note below, some actually go bankrupt and leave the business), it is (as 
we observed above) hard to state this budget constraint very easily. Two im- 
portant simple observations are that almost all institutions of higher education 
are nonprofit organizations9 and that most rely significantly on other resources 
of  revenue  (e.g., governmental appropriations,  alumni and corporate dona- 
tions, research contracts and grants) to supplement tuition. lo 
There  are  immediate  implications:  (a) the  standard  paradigm  of  profit- 
maximizing behavior as a motive for pricing,  output, and/or entry decisions 
has only limited explanatory power; (b) the survivorship paradigm  (Alchian 
1950; Winter  1971; Nelson, Winter,  and Schuette  1976), as a backstop to 
profit maximization,  loses much of  its  force in explaining these decisions, 
since nontuition contributors’ goals will be important in determining a uni- 
versity’s survival.  In  short, market pressures  impose less discipline on the 
university than they do on the firm. Senior administrators, or more generally 
the decision processes of the university, operate under conditions of consider- 
able slack, This freedom leaves the university room to live its version of the 
quiet life or to pursue the funds (and thus necessarily the goals) of nontuition 
contributors to the university. 
The absence of profit-maximizing enterprises among universities is worthy 
of further consideration. Why should this be so? A simple claim that there are 
substantial  asymmetric  information  (agent-principal) problems  surrounding 
the  instructor-student  relationship-which  might make student “customers” 
suspicious of  the motives of the instructors in a profit-seeking enterprise-is 
not  sufficient by  itself.  It Our society  tolerates  and  supports  profit-seeking 
trade schools, law firms, and medical practices, where agent-principal prob- 
lems are substantial. The hospital  sector has a mix of private nonprofit,  reli- 
gious, and government-operated enterprises (as is true of universities); but the 
hospital sector also includes for-profit enterprises. A better explanation than 
information asymmetry is the absence of good (human) capital markets. For 
most people, higher education is a good investment; it would remain a good 
9. For 1985-86,  only 220 (6.6  percent) out of 3,340 institutions of higher learning listed by the 
U.S.  Department of Education were in the category of “organized as profit making” (U.S. De- 
partment of Education  1991, 229).  Of  the 220, over 86 percent (190) offered a program that 
extended for less than four years.  It appears that a large fraction of  this “for-profit’’ group was 
trade and technical schools (ibid., 228). 
10. For public universities in 1986-87,  tuition accounted for 14.7 percent of total current-fund 
revenues, and sales and services accounted for another 21.2 percent, leaving 64.1 percent to be 
covered from nonfee sources. For private universities, tuition accounted for 39.6 percent of  reve- 
nues, and sales and services accounted for another 21.7 percent, leaving 38.7 percent to be  cov- 
ered from nonfee sources (ibid., 295-96). 
11. A related, and more insidious, possibility is raised by Spencer (1991a. 1991b), who claims 
that college accreditation bodies are hostile toward for-profit educational enterprises. 22  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
investment  even  if  tuition  were  set equal to  cost.I2 However,  most  young 
people cannot pay the full cost of an education; they cannot borrow the funds, 
since they have no collateral. An interesting consequence of this shortfall be- 
tween  tuition  and  the  costs of  education  is an  attenuation  of  the  ability  of 
students (as customers) to influence the ways in which universities behave. 
1.4.2  Inputs 
We start with input markets,I3 primarily because the analysis seems clearest 
there.  With  the exception of  the teacher (professor) inputs,  universities  are 
just one among many input users, and the markets are basically competitive. 
Further,  with  respect  to  professor  inputs,  universities  clearly  do compete 
among themselves to fill positions.  The individual university demand curves 
for professors,  though, warrant  some further consideration.  Those demand 
curves are, arguably, derived demand curves-derived  from the demand for 
the university’s outputs. To  some extent those demand curves do reflect the 
nature of universities’ outputs: for example, teaching colleges are more likely 
to look  for good teachers;  research  universities  are more likely to demand 
productive  researchers.  Still, research  universities  “sell”  large  amounts  of 
undergraduate education; the marginal revenue product of outstanding teach- 
ers would seem to be quite high. Why do good teachers command such small 
monetary  (and other) rewards  in large research  universities?  Why  have re- 
search universities been so reluctant to establish job categories for outstanding 
teachers? Why has competition not operated in this dimension? 
On this last point, we note that professional schools have been more respon- 
sive with respect to teaching. Many schools, even those that pride themselves 
as research  institutions,  have established  “clinical  professor”  positions  that 
often  emphasize  teaching  or  other nonresearch  contributions  of  a  faculty 
member.  We suspect a reason for this is that in some professional  schools, 
particularly  law  and  business  schools, a high  proportion  of  gross receipts 
comes  in  the  form of  tuition  and deferred  tuition  (alumni gifts).  For  such 
schools, student satisfaction impinges more immediately on the school’s bud- 
get constraint. (This argument, however, cannot explain the existence of clin- 
ical professors in medical schools.) 
Finally, our casual impression is that university teaching has been resistant 
to technological change. Why is this so? Surely it is not the case in the age of 
the computer and the VCR that the technology of teaching is inherently inca- 
pable of significant technological improvement. It is also our casual impres- 
sion that the education that takes place outside the higher education industry 
12. Human capital is even more of a bargain than it usually appears, if one assumes that edu- 
cation not only improves productivity on the job (an effect that shows up  in  wages) but also 
increases the ability to use leisure time. See Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1991) for some astonishing 
calculations. 
13. We exclude the analysis of  incoming students as inputs, which was covered in section I .3. 23  The University in the Marketplace 
(businesses and the military, for example) has embraced technical change 
more rapidly than have colleges and universities.  l4 
1.4.3  outputs 
Universities are clearly multiproduct enterprises that operate in many mar- 
kets.  Among  their outputs are educational services for  undergraduate stu- 
dents, educational services for graduate students (arts and sciences, as well as 
professional education), research, room and board services for resident stu- 
dents, and athletic entertainment services. We will focus primarily on the mar- 
ket for educational services. 
Do universities compete with each other in the market for educational ser- 
vices? Casual empiricism suggests that they do compete for students. The 
terms of this competition include the quality (somehow measured) of  the uni- 
versity, the quality of the student body that the university attracts, the location 
and physical surroundings of the university, and the price (tuition) charged. 
To  support our claim that universities do compete on price, we  offer the 
following: University deans (including heads of programs and heads of pro- 
fessional schools) do pay attention to the tuition levels of universities of  simi- 
lar quality and/or in similar locations and are concerned that their own tuition 
levels not diverge appreciably from those of  their rivals.  Further, the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division recently investigated alleged meet- 
ings by  administrators from at least 23 prestigious East Coast colleges and 
universities, who met annually to agree on the scholarship levels that would 
be  offered to prospective freshmen (Jaschik  1989; Putka  1989; Salop and 
White 1991).  Is One participant apparently feared that without these meetings, 
the universities “might be dragged into a kind of  ‘bidding war’ for the best 
students” (Cotter 1989). It is interesting to note that another 33 universities 
that were under investigation for sharing information on scholarship aid in- 
cluded the Great Lakes Colleges Association (a group of  12 liberal arts col- 
leges in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio), a group of  8 women’s colleges (6 of 
which are located in the South), and an additional group of  12 private univer- 
sities that had very high tuition fees (Jaschik 1989). Within each of these three 
groups, the schools would likely have perceived one another as direct compet- 
itors and would have been interested in restraining price competition. 
This evidence is, at best, only indirect support for the claim that price com- 
petition among universities is a significant phenomenon. It is supported, how- 
ever, by many of the studies of student enrollment choices among universities. 
14. For brief discussions of efforts to  provide higher education that is more responsive to “cus- 
tomers’” demands, see Spencer (1991a, 1991b) and Charlier (1991). 
15. In May  1991 the Justice Department formally charged eight Ivy League schools and Mas- 
sachusetts Institute of Technology with price fixing. The eight Ivies immediately settled the case 
with a consent decree (in which they did not admit any guilt but  agreed to discontinue the meet- 
ings), but MIT declined to join the settlement and was subsequently found guilty at trial. 24  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
These  studies often  include as explanatory  variables  the  tuition  (and other 
fees) and scholarship amounts of both the selected university and those that 
were rejected. The coefficients on the tuition and scholarship amounts (or, in 
some studies, the net cost) offered by the rejected schools are usually signifi- 
cant and have the expected signs (e.g., the coefficient on the tuition level of a 
rejected university  has a positive  sign) (Radner and Miller  1975; Miller and 
Radner  1975; Hight  1976; Fuller,  Manski, and Wise  1982; Corman  1983; 
Manski and Wise  1983; Ehrenberg  and  Sherman  1984). Thus, students do 
seem to be sensitive to the prices of the alternatives open to them. (Unfortu- 
nately, we have not been able to uncover studies that examine the price cross- 
elasticity  of  demand  among specific  universities,  which  would  provide  us 
with a greater understanding of the specific nature of the competition among 
the universities.)16 
It seems unlikely that price competition among universities approaches the 
textbook model of the perfect competition among wheat farmers.  Individual 
universities  have perceived quality differences and  ‘brand-name’’ reputations 
that surely influence student choice. Also, locational differences among uni- 
versities imply transportation cost differences (as well as psychic “away from 
home” differences,  which can be a plus or a minus for a university’s attraction) 
for many students.  l7 
Competition among universities appears to have both geographic-space and 
product-space  dimensions.  High-prestige schools probably compete in a na- 
tionwide market.  For example, in the market for freshman applicants, Har- 
16. These investigations would require time-series cross-section panels that would either use 
individual university applications as the dependent variables (and include university tuition levels 
as a right-hand side variable) or use individual student applications and acceptance choices as the 
dependent variables. 
Spies (1990) has studied how family income affects the probability of  applying to an expensive 
and selective private college or university. Spies found that the relationship between the probabil- 
ity of applying and income had  a gentler slope for those who applied for financial aid than for 
those who did not. Without criticizing Spies’s work (which is careful and involves the replication 
of the basic results over three different cohorts of applicants), we note that he did not pose his 
question (what determines the probability of  applying to a particular kind of college?) as that of 
estimating a demand function. Price (gross or net tuition) is not included as a variable. McPherson 
and Winston (1991) develop a model in which universities compete but in  which information 
asymmetries between sellers (universities) and buyers (students) cause the terms of competition 
to focus on costly symbols of quality and also cause buyers to judge quality on the basis of price 
(tuition); this latter effect would deter the sellers from cutting prices in order to compete and could 
even impart a price-raising bias to their behavior. McPherson and Winston offer no evidence to 
support their model. We believe that the evidence from the enrollment choice studies cited in the 
text, in  which the coefficients on the tuition levels of  rejected universities have positive signs, 
casts doubt on the validity of the McPherson-Winston hypothesis. 
17. In fall 1988 over 80  percent of freshmen enrolled in a college or university in the same state 
in which they had previously resided (U.S. Department of Education 1991, 196); this percentage 
has been  remarkably  stable over the past two decades (Harris  1972). In  most of  the demand 
studies, distance from home is a negative factor in a potential student’s choice; see Hoenack and 
Weiler (1976); Fuller, Manski, and Wise (1982); Manski and Wise (1983); Ehrenberg and Sher- 
man (1984); and McClain, Vance, and Wood (1984). 
18. Garvin (1980, chap. 2) makes some of these same arguments. 25  The University in the Marketplace 
vard and Stanford probably  compete for roughly  the same pool of students 
(and probably also compete for a common pool of applicants to their medical, 
business,  and law schools and to most of their graduate programs in arts and 
sciences).  Schools with  lesser prestige  are likely  to compete among them- 
selves on a regional basis; the lure of a specific national “brand name” is likely 
to be less important for students in this market segment, and the costs asso- 
ciated with regional location are likely to loom relatively larger. Finally, uni- 
versities are likely to compete most intensively with universities in their same 
quality segment. For instance, Yale and Harvard are likely to consider each 
other as competitors, while  neither  is likely  to think  of  the  University  of 
Bridgeport as a competitor. 
We can now discuss a number of important topics related to competition 
among universities. 
Tuition Levels and Scholarship Levels 
Suppose a university  charges a tuition level of X  to all its  i students and 
offers a vector of scholarships Y to those same i students (0  5  Y, 5  X). As a 
first  approximation,  if  the  university  instead  charged  a  tuition  of 
X  + $10,000 and offered  a  new  vector  of  scholarships  of  Y  + $10,000, 
nothing should change;I9 if the university-because  it asks for family finan- 
cial information  from all its applicants-could  selectively offer scholarship 
increments  that were less  than $lO,OOO  to some students and still not  lose 
those students, then the university’s  net revenues would increase.2o In prin- 
ciple, the university’s  net  revenues  would  continue to increase  as it raised 
tuition levels and selectively increased scholarship amounts until all but one 
of its students were on partial or complete scholarship; in essence, the univer- 
sity would be practicing first-degree price discrimination. Universities clearly 
do engage in price discrimination to some extent. Scholarship aid (including 
Pel1 Grants) amounted to 24 percent of aggregate tuition receipts by private 
universities and to 35 percent by public universities in 1986-87  (U.S.  Depart- 
ment of Education  1991, 291-92).  Still, one can ask why universities do not 
engage in more of it and why they do not make a greater effort to achieve the 
first-degree price discrimination ideal described in the previous paragraph. 
There are a number of possible answers to this question, but one of them, 
we believe,  can immediately be discarded. It might be claimed that students 
would somehow perceive tuition increases matched by identical scholarship 
funding increases as not being neutral and that they would thereby be deterred 
19. This is equivalent to  an  auto dealer’s  adding $10,000  to all  list prices but  also offering 
$IO,OOO “discounts .” 
20. We  abstract from any  added administrative costs. Also, it  is worth noting  that the auto 
dealer would be unlikely to succeed with a similar price discrimination scheme, because of com- 
petition among auto dealers and because auto dealers typically do not know a prospective buyer’s 
income or  other characteristics (though the dealer may learn them after the sale, while arranging 
for the financing of a purchase). 26  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
by  the  tuition  increase (Hearn  and Longanecker  1985).  The available  evi- 
dence, however, points strongly toward our equivalence hypothesis.  Studies 
of student enrollment choices among types of universities sometimes include 
both tuition  levels and scholarship amounts  (offered by  the chosen  and re- 
jected universities) as explanatory variables. These studies show that tuition 
levels and scholarship amounts have virtually identical coefficients (with op- 
posite signs) in explaining student enrollment  choices  (Fuller, Manski, and 
Wise  1982; Manski and Wise 1983; Ehrenberg  and Sherman 1984). Thus, 
students who are offered scholarship aid do not seem to suffer from “tuition 
illusion,” and claims of nonneutrality are unlikely to be adequate explanations 
for why universities do not practice price discrimination to a greater extent. 
We are left with two possible answers to this question. The first is that price 
competition among universities would undercut and unravel this extreme form 
of  price  discrimination. The second  is that  the  nontuition  funds providers 
would  be offended by this  apparent gouging  by the university (i.e., the in- 
creases would not be neutral from their perspective),  and their contributions 
would decrease, thereby reducing (or eliminating) the net revenue gain to the 
university from the price discrimination  scheme. Among the most important 
contributors  are future alumni,  whose  generosity  toward  their  alma  mater 
could possibly be severely tempered by the memory that she had charged all 
that the traffic would bear. We currently do not have enough information about 
price  competition among universities  or  about  the  behavior  of  nontuition 
funds providers to assess the relative importance of these explanations. 
Scholarships and Price Competition 
In section 1.3 we suggested that a price discrimination scheme (i.e., selec- 
tive scholarships) could allow the university to achieve a desired mix of stu- 
dents, which would enhance the efficiency and productivity of the university’s 
educational output. Is this form of price discrimination compatible with com- 
petition among universities? Or does the university’s desire for an optimal mix 
create a potential  market failure that would argue for limits on competition 
and that could justify the alleged  agreements  on scholarship  levels that the 
Justice Department investigated? 
The case for a market failure does not appear to be strong. The externality 
of  the “desirable” students is wholly internalized within the university. If, say, 
a “desirable”  student enhances the educational experience of other students, 
then those other students should be willing to pay higher tuition to a university 
that offers this diversity; the externality  is internalized.  Though competition 
for desirable  students, through  larger price  discounts  (i.e.,  larger  scholar- 
ships), reduces university net revenues,  this is true of competition for all of 
the university’s  outputs.*‘ Further,  the experience of  the past decade in the 
21. We see only one special problem that suggests special treatment for this industry. If, as we 
argued in the last part of  section 1.3, diversity is a small-numbers problem,  then coordination 
among universities in allocating students may be desirable. 27  The University in the Marketplace 
airline industry suggests that modest levels of price discrimination can survive 
in markets that are workably competitive. 
Pricing within the University 
Casual empiricism suggests that the marginal costs of educating an under- 
graduate in the  sciences are substantially higher than  the  marginal  costs of 
educating an undergraduate in the humanities. Nevertheless, we generally see 
uniform tuition levels within a university across most majors (though different 
schools or programs within a university may charge modest fee differentials). 
Why is this so? 
We have already (in section 1.2) dealt with the normative issue of whether 
such uniform pricing generates cross-subsidies among areas. There is still the 
positive question of why this uniformity occurs and persists. 
In a multioutput (profit-maximizing) enterprise with common costs (econ- 
omies of scope) and with differing marginal costs among the separate outputs, 
pricing  is a complex  phenomenon.  A monopolist  will  look  to the demand 
elasticities of  its separate products,  as well as their marginal costs, to deter- 
mine its  prices.  A firm  in competitive markets  will seek a combination of 
prices and products that yields an aggregate surplus over its separate marginal 
costs that is adequate to cover its common costs. Though neither market struc- 
ture necessarily generates an outcome in which the firm’s prices correlate pos- 
itively with its marginal costs, uniformity of prices for outputs with substan- 
tially different marginal costs would occur purely by chance (and would be 
highly unlikely to replicate itself in thousands of separate enterprises).22  And 
with marginal costs as the starting point for pricing under either form of mar- 
ket structure, there is a mild presumption that a positive correlation between 
prices and marginal costs should emerge.23 
At first glance, then, tuition uniformity seems to be an oddity that is incon- 
sistent with profit-maximizing behavior in any market structure. One expla- 
nation might be as follows: Many undergraduate institutions do not charge per 
course or per credit but rather per semester or quarter. In principle all students 
can take all courses  (or could if  they  so planned  their programs).  What is 
being sold is the ability to pick from a menu, and this is no more strange than 
the observation that many salad bars charge per trip rather than per nutrient. 
The salad bar analogy is strongest,  however,  where monitoring  costs are 
high relative to the price of the items. This does not seem to be the case for 
student course enrollments.  An alternative model would be that of two-part 
22. Where marginal cost differences are small and the transactions costs of enforcing marginal 
cost pricing are  high, we are  likely to  see uniform pricing. For example, restaurants typically 
charge a uniform price for coffee, regardless of whether a customer adds cream and/or sugar. On 
the  other hand, delicatessens often charge extra for extra materials that  can be ordered with a 
sandwich (e.g., lettuce and/or tomato), presumably because the marginal costs are higher and the 
monitoring costs are small. 
23. Restaurants generally charge higher prices for their steaks than for their hamburgers and 
higher prices for their strawberry shortcake than for their donuts. 28  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
tariffs, in which customers are charged a lump-sum entry fee and are then 
charged prices for individual services that  approximate marginal costs (Oi 
1971). In  this framework, then, we  would expect to see all students pay  a 
common enrollment fee (subject to the price discrimination possibilities dis- 
cussed above) and then be charged specific course fees that were roughly com- 
mensurate with the marginal costs of those courses. 
We are thus left with the puzzle of uniform or near-uniform tuition levels in 
the presence of substantial marginal cost levels. Perhaps this is another area 
where the preferences and prejudices of nontuition funds providers are impor- 
tant. Again, we believe that this is an area that warrants further research. 
Pricing and Prestige 
Mercedes automobiles sell for appreciably more than Chevrolets; Rolex 
watches  sell for appreciably more than  Timexes. But  even  among private 
universities, high-prestige institutions often do not charge tuition levels sub- 
stantially above those of lower-prestige institutions. Why is this so? Why do 
high-prestige institutions decline to try to capture most of  the rents that are 
associated with their “brand names”? 
A recent survey of graduate professional schools provides striking evidence 
to support this picture of relative unif~rmity.~~  In tables 1.1  and 1.2  we present 
the tuition levels and expected starting salaries for graduates of  top-ranked 
business schools and law schools. If we focus on the private universities in the 
we find a picture of relative uniformity of tuitions among the lead- 
ing schools. There is a mild positive correlation between a school’s tuition 
and its rank: for business schools the rank correlation is 0.58; for law schools 
it is 0.46. When we look at the correlation between tuition and expected an- 
nual starting salaries, there are again positive rank correlations: 0.56 for busi- 
ness schools and 0.71 for law schools. Simple ordinary least squares regres- 
sions of  tuition levels (TL) on  expected salaries (ES), however,  yield the 
following (with t-statistics in parentheses): 
Business schools: TL =  11.60 +  0.085 ES; r  = 0.55; n  = 16 . 
(6.35)  (2.48) 
Law schools:  TL =  9.05 +  0.095 ES; r  = 0.69; n  = 15 . 
(5.01)  (3.48) 
These results indicate that  students at  business and law schools where ex- 
pected  starting salaries are higher do pay  higher tuitions, but those higher 
annual tuitions are less than 10 percent of the higher expected annual starting 
salary.  26 
24. We do not have any immediate evidence concerning undergraduate institutions, but we are 
reasonably confident that a similar picture would emerge. 
25. State universities, with the exception of the University of Michigan, are charging tuitions- 
even to out-of-state students-that  have more to do with state legislatures’ policies than with any 
notions of  market pricing. 
26. These results are consistent with those found by Ehrenberg (1989). 29  The University in the Marketplace 
Table 1.1  Rankings of Leading Business Schools 
I990  Average  Rank, Excluding State Universities 
RanWSchool  Tuitiona  Salary'  Overall  'hition  Salary 
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Source: US.  News & World Report, April 29, 1991, p. 68. 
"In thousands. 
Finally, the more limited data in table 1.3, for medical schools, show even 
less correlation (rank correlation = 0.09) between rank and tuition than for 
the business and law schools. 
Again we have a puzzle. The students, rather than the schools, are captur- 
ing the rents.27  Even if schools provide only signals (Spence 1974) or filters, 
is the filter worth this little? Are the preferences of nontuition funds providers 
important here? Again,  we suggest that this is a fruitful area for future re- 
search. 
27. It has been suggested to us that the higher starting salaries offered to the graduates of  the 
leading law and business schools may be just a cost-of-living compensation adjustment; that is, 
the leading professional schools tend to be located in metropolitan areas with above-average living 
costs and their graduates tend to work in these same pricey areas. If this were so, the students' net 
rents would be much smaller than the gross differentials in starting salaries indicate. Our casual 
impression from the cost-of-living comparison data gathered by Kramer (1989) for law school 
graduates is that the net rents accruing to the graduates of leading professional schools are still 
substantially positive. Without more complete data on the location choices of the graduates of the 
leading and lesser schools and of the cost-of-living differentials among these locations, however, 
we are unable to pursue this net rent hypothesis any further. 30  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
Table 1.2  Rankings of Leading Law Schools 
1990  Average  Rank, Excluding State Universities 
RanWSchool  Tuition‘  salarya  Overall  Tuition  Salary 
Out-of-State  Starting 
1. Yale  $15.4  $66.1  1  7.5  7 
2.  Harvard  14.5  67.2  2  14  4 
3. Chicago  15.7  71.0  3  5  3 
4. Stanford  14.9  65.0  4  12  10 
5.  Columbia  16.1  78.3  5  3  1 
6. Michigan  15.7  59.6  -  -  - 
7. NYU  16.6  76.7  6  1  2 
8.  Virginia  10.1  63.0 
9. Duke  15.3  60.2  7  9  13 
10. Penn  15.1  64.6  8  11  11 
11. Georgetown  15.4  66.0  9  7.5  8 
12. UC Berkeley  8.8  58.0  -  -  - 
13. Cornell  15.9  66.2  10  4  6 
14. Northwestern  15.5  65.  I  11  6  9 
15. Texas  6.0  52.6  -  -  - 
16. USC  16.4  66.7  12  2  5 
17. Vanderbilt  14.8  55.0  13  13  15 
18. UCLA  9.0  62.7  -  -  - 
19. Iowa  7.7  50.0 
29. UC Hastings  8.7  62.7  -  -  - 
21.  Wisconsin  9.1  41.5  -  -  - 
22. G Washington  15.2  61  .O  14  10  12 
23. Minnesota  8.7  45.7  -  -  - 
24. Notre Dame  13.0  56.9  15  15  14 
25. N Carolina  7.0  40.5  -  -  - 
Source: US.  News & World Report, April 29,  1991, p. 74. 
-  -  - 
-  -  - 
thousands. 
Entry and Exit 
Entry and exit play important roles in the standard competitive model, help- 
ing to expand or contract supply and thereby hastening the elimination of 
short-run rents or losses.  Entry can occur de novo  (by start-up firms) or 
through “product extensions” by existing firms. 
Table 1.4 shows the number of two-year and four-year colleges and univer- 
sities that have been  in  the market over the past 40 years. There has been 
substantial growth in these numbers; that is, net entry has been considerable. 
(It should be noted that over time some two-year schools have converted to 
four-year schools and some schools in both categories have exited the market 
entirely, so gross entry in all categories has been larger than any net calcula- 
tion would indicate.) Table 1.5, covering professional schools, tells the same 
story of substantial net entry. 
What motivated these entry decisions? It is clear that the expanding popu- 
lation and rising incomes of the U.S. economy created an increased demand 
for university education in the United  States; the rising international repu- 31  The University in the Marketplace 
lsble 1.3  Rankings of Leading Medical Schools 
Rank,  Excluding 
1990  State Universities 
Out-of-State 
RanWSchool  Tuitiona  Overall  Tuition 
1. Harvard  $18.0  1  3 
2. Johns Hopkins  16.5  2  7 
3.  Duke  14.2  3  11 
4. UC San Francisco  5.9 
5. Yale  17.0  4  6 
6. Washington University  14.9  5.5  9 
7. Penn  18.3  5.5  2 
8.  Stanford  17.9  7  4 
9. UCLA  8.0 
10.  Cornell  19.2  8  1 
11. Michigan  20.4  -  - 
12. Columbia  11.9  9  5 
13. U  Washington  12.5 
14. Chicago  16.1  10  8 
15. Vanderhilt  14.6  11  10 
-  - 
-  - 
-  - 
Source: U.S. News & World Report, April 29,  1991, p. 68. 
'In  thousands. 
Table 1.4  Number of Institutions of Higher Education 
Excluding Branch Campuses 
Publicly  Privately  Publicly  Privately 
Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled 
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Source: U.S. Department of Education (1991), 228. 
'Data for this year are not entirely comparable with earlier years because of revised survey pro- 
cedures. 
bLarge increases are due to the inclusion of trade and technical schools. 
tation of  U.S. universities also added to demand. Total student enrollment 
(the intersection of  demand and  supply) rose  from 2.3 million in  1947 to 
13.0 millionzs  in 1988. Still, this increase in output might have been accom- 
28. This includes part-time students. 32  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
Table 1.5  Number of Institutions Conferring Professional Degrees 
Year  Dentistry  Medicine  Law 
1949-50  40  72  n.a. 
1959-60  45  79  134 
1969-70  48  86  145 
1974-75  52  I04  154 
1979-80  58  I12  I79 
1984-85  59  I20  181 
1987-88  55  I20  I80 
Source: U.S. Department of Education (1991),  248 
modated  solely through  internal expansion of the  1,85 1 institutions that ex- 
isted in 1949-50.  Why did entry occur alongside internal expan~ion?~~  Even 
if we exclude the growth in the number of publicly controlled institutions (the 
causes of which might be harder to model), there were still increases of over 
50 percent  in the numbers of  two-year30 and four-year  privately  controlled 
institutions. Why did this entry occur? We would guess that the availability of 
private donations and endowments to provide the start-up capital for new pri- 
vate institutions (the equivalent of the owners’ initial investments in any for- 
profit enterprise) was often an instrumental factor, but there were surely other 
factors  as well.  Research  on university  entry behavior  (including  “product 
extensions”-new  programs or schools begun by existing universities) would 
appear to be worthwhile. 
One other feature of table 1.4 is worthy  of notice: the data indicate that 
publicly controlled universities are much more likely to establish branch cam- 
puses than are privately controlled universities.  It is unclear to us why these 
private institutions believe that their brand names cannot be extended to mul- 
tiple 10cations.~’  This too appears to be an area that warrants research. 
Finally, table 1.6 shows the number of colleges and universities that have 
shut their doors in the past three decades-that  is, they have exited the edu- 
cation market.32  The exit decision by for-profit firms in the private sector is 
29.  Enrollments at publicly controlled universities expanded by over 780  percent between 1947 
and  1988,  while enrollments in privately controlled institutions expanded by  over 240 percent. 
Both of these expansions greatly exceeded the percentage increases in the numbers of  institutions, 
so internal expansion clearly did accompany entry. 
30. Some of the increase occurred through entry by for-profit trade and technical schools. 
3 1. State chartering restrictions appear to prevent universities from branching across state lines 
(much as is true for commercial banks). But the near-absence of intrastate branching by private 
universities remains a puzzle. Why does the University of California have eight branch locations, 
while Stanford only has its “home office”? A few universities have established locations abroad 
and in Washington, D.C., but these branch locations are usually designed for special programs of 
their students based at the home campuses, rather than as freestanding (full-service) branches. 
32. In  some  instances,  private  universities  have  in  essence  exited,  but  they  have  been 
superseded by public institutions. 33  The University in the Marketplace 
Table 1.6  Number of Institutions of Higher Education that Have Closed 
Their Doors 
Publicly  Pnvately 
Controlled  Controlled 
4-year  2-year  4-year  2-year 
Total, excluding branch campuses, 
Total, including branch campuses, 
1960-61 to 1989-90  1  37  167  118 
1969-70  to 1989-90  4  29  152  90 
Source: U.S. Department of Education (1991), 231. 
not a well-researched area, so we have even less here to serve as a basis for 
explaining university behavior. Again, research would be worthwhile.)’ 
1.4.4  Positioning in the Market 
How do universities position themselves in the market? Why do Harvard, 
Northeastern, Antioch, and Grinnell attract the specific groups of students that 
they do? How can they change their positioning (e.g., improve their perceived 
quality and prestige)? How often (and why) do universities attempt to change 
their positioning? When (and why) do they succeed (or fail)? 
As  was  true  for entry,  we suspect  that  availability  of  private  and  public 
contributions and endowments are important (this especially seems to be true 
for professional schools in the past two decades). Still, further research could 
surely shed useful light here. 
1.4.5  What about a Monopoly Model? 
As noted earlier, the autonomous cost increase model advocated by Massy 
(1989) assumes that most (if not all) universities are separate monopolies that 
face inelastic demands and thus can raise their prices at will to accommodate 
rising  We  believe that the empirical evidence,  scanty though  it may 
be, throws substantial doubt on this basis for Massy’s analysis. 
Still, let us suppose that universities truly were monopolies. The theory of 
monopoly, of course, yields a prediction about the level of prices of a monop- 
oly relative to those of an otherwise similar competitive industry. It says noth- 
ing about mtes of price increases. If universities really were separate monop- 
33. It has been suggested to us that the cloudy property rights that accompany the nonprofit 
status of private universities may impede their ability to shut their doors and liquidate assets. 
34. As we noted in footnote  16 above, McPherson and Winston (1991) offer an  alternative 
model that might explain a pattern of secular cost increases: asymmetric information problems 
cause universities to compete through costly symbols of quality. As we explained there, however, 
we believe that the available evidence casts serious doubt on the McPherson-Winston hypothesis. 34  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
olies and could raise their prices at will, then the important question would 
be: Why have universities not raised their tuition earlier and faster? 
We find it hard to believe that over 3,000 monopoly university administra- 
tors, year after year,  would have consistently  passed up opportunities to in- 
crease revenues substantially by raising tuition. Though it is possible that per- 
ceptions  of  gouging  by  nontuition  funds providers  might  have  stayed  the 
tuition-raising hands of some university administrators during some periods, 
we doubt that the gouging perceptions could have been a complete restraint at 
all times. 
Could it be that universities are already pricing at monopoly levels and that 
it is these elevated prices that generate substantial cross-elasticities of demand 
and thus bring the universities into competition with each other? If this prop- 
osition were true, it would mean that universities’ prices are currently gener- 
ating explicit or implicit rents and that there is a lower set of pices that would 
eliminate the rents and at which there would be low or zero demand cross- 
elasticities among the univer~ities.~~ 
The proper test of this proposition would require the measurement of uni- 
versities’ rents at current prices. Since universities currently  charge tuition 
and other fees that cover only a fraction of their costs and since universities’ 
input prices are largely determined in competitive markets, the existence of 
explicit rents seems unlikely. Also, as we noted above, it appears that many 
high-prestige  universities  are not  even exploiting  the rents associated  with 
their brand names. 
It is possible that universities are absorbing potential explicit rents in the 
form of production  inefficiencies-Leibenstein’s  (1966) X-inefficiency. With 
the presence of over 3,000 universities in the market, we consider it unlikely 
that X-inefficiency  would  uniformly  hide the rents that would otherwise be 
accruing to these monopolies. Still, in the absence of a comparison model of 
an X-efficient university, we must remain somewhat agnostic on this point. 
1.5  Conclusion 
The analysis of university behavior in a market context has been an under- 
researched area in economics. In this paper we have argued that a competitive 
framework for analysis appears reasonable but that the nonprofit status of uni- 
versities and the major role of  nontuition  funds providers  introduce special 
35. For antitrust purposes, this is the proper test of a monopoly. In a major antitrust case that 
tried to determine whether Du Pont had monopoly power in the sale of cellophane (US.  v. E.  I. 
DuPont de Nemours and Co.,  351 U.S.  377 [I956J)  the U.S. Supreme Court made the mistake of 
looking only at the cross-elasticities of the demand at the prevailing prices for cellophane and not 
asking about the rents that were accruing and about what the cross-elasticities and rents might 
have been at  lower prices.  As many commentators noted,  if  Du Pont did have  a monopoly in 
cellophane, profit-maximizing behavior would call for the company to raise its price to the point 
where significant cross-elasticities with other flexible wrapping materials would have developed 
(Stocking and Mueller 1955; Posner 1976, 127-128). 35  The University in the Marketplace 
features into any competitive structure.  We  have offered some insights into 
university behavior and raised a number of interesting questions and puzzles. 
We  suggest that these questions and puzzles provide a rich agenda for future 
research that will help us better understand market behavior in this important 
sector of the U.S. economy. 
References 
Alchian,  Amen A. 1950. Uncertainty, evolution,  and economic theory. Journal of 
Political Economy 58:211-21. 
Becker, William B.  1990. The demand for higher education.  In  The economics of 
American  universities,  ed. Stephen A.  Hoenack and Eileen L. Collins,  155-88. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Bok, Derek.  1990. Universities and the future of America. Durham, N.C.: Duke Uni- 
versity Press. 
Bowen, Howard R. 1980. The costs of higher education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Charlier, Marj.  1991. First principles: Ailing college treats student as customer, soon 
is thriving. The Wall Street Journal, July 17, Al. 
Cohn, Elchanan,  Sherrie L. W.  Rhine,  and Maria C. Santos.  1989. Institutions of 
higher education as multi-product firms: Economies of scale. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 7 1:284-90. 
Corman, Hope.  1983. Postsecondary education enrollment responses by  recent high 
school graduates and older adults. Journal of  Human Resources 17:247-67. 
Cotter,  William  R.  1989.  Colleges’  efforts to  rationalize  the  financial-aid system 
should not be treated as violations of antitrust laws. Chronicle of Higher Education, 
October 4, B  1. 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. 1989. An economic analysis of the market for law school stu- 
dents. Journal of Legal Education 39:627-54. 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., and Daniel R. Sherman. 1984. Optimal financial aid policies 
for a selective university. Journal of Human Resources 19:202-30. 
Faulhaber, Gerald R. 1975. Cross-subsidization: Pricing in public enterprise. Ameri- 
can Economic Review 65:966-77. 
Fuller, Winship C., Charles F. Manski, and David A. Wise.  1982. New evidence on 
the economic determinants of postsecondary schooling choices. Journal of Human 
Resources 17:477-98. 
Gale, David, and Lloyd  S. Shapley.  1962. College admissions and the stability of 
marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69:9-15. 
Garvin, David A. 1980. The economics of university behavior. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Hansen, W.  Lee, and Burton A. Weisbrod. 1969. Benefits, costs, andjnance ofpublic 
higher education. Chicago: Markham. 
Harris,  Seymour  E.  1972. A  statistical  portrait  of  higher  education.  New  York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Hartigan, John A., and Alexandra K. Wigdor, eds.  1989. Fairness in  employment 
testing: Validity generalization, minority issues, and the general aptitude test bat- 
tery. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Hearn, James C., and David Longanecker.  1985. Enrollment effects of  alternative 
postsecondary pricing policies. Journal of  Higher Education 56:485-508. 36  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
Hight, Joseph E. 1976. The demand for higher education in the U.S., 1927-72:  The 
public and private institutions. Journal of  Human Resources 105  12-19. 
Hoenack, Stephen A,, and Eileen L. Collins, eds.  1990. The economics of  American 
universities. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Hoenack, Stephen A,, and William C. Weiler. 1976. Cost related tuition policies and 
university enrollments. Journal of  Human Resources 10:332-60. 
James, Estelle.  1978. Product mix and cost disaggregation: A reinterpretation of the 
economics of higher education. Journal of  Human Resources 12:  157-86. 
. 1986. Cross-subsidization in higher education: Does it prevent private choice 
and public policy? In Private education: Studies  in choice and public policy, ed. 
Daniel Levy, 237-57.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
. 1990. Decision processes and priorities in higher education. In The economics 
of  American universities, ed. Stephen A. Hoenack and Eileen L. Collins, 77-106. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
James, Estelle, and Egon Neuberger.  1981. The university department as a nonprofit 
labor cooperative. Public Choice 36585-612. 
Jaschik,  Scott.  1989. Investigation into tuition fixing spreads.  Chronicle of  Higher 
Education, October 4,  A 1. 
Jorgenson,  Dale W., and Barbara M. Fraumeni.  1991. The output of  the education 
sector. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper no.  1542. Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University. 
Kelso, Alexander  S.,  Jr., and  Vincent P.  Crawford.  1982. Job matching,  coalition 
formation, and gross substitutes. Econometrica 50: 1483-1504. 
Kerr, Clark.  1964. The uses of  the university. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Kramer, John R. 1989. Who will pay the piper or leave the check on the table for the 
other guy? Journal of  Legal Education 39:655-95. 
Leibenstein,  Harvey.  1966. Allocative efficiency vs. X-inefficiency. American  Eco- 
nomic Review 56(June): 392-415. 
Leslie, Larry L., and Paul T. Brinkman.  1987. Student price response in higher edu- 
cation. Journal of  Higher Education 58: 181-203. 
Manski,  Charles F., and David A.  Wise.  1983. College choice  in America. Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Massy, William F.  1989. A strategy for  productivity improvements in college and uni- 
versity academic departments. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University. 
McClain, David, Bradley Vance, and Elizabeth Wood. 1984. Understanding and pre- 
dicting the yield in  the MBA admissions process.  Research  in  Higher Education 
McPherson, Michael S.,  and Gordon C. Winston. 1991. The economics of cost, price, 
and quality in U.S. higher education. Williams College Working Paper no. DP-13. 
Williamstown, Mass. April. 
Miller,  Leonard  S.,  and  Roy  Radner.  1975. Demand  and  supply  in  United States 
higher education: A technical supplement. Berkeley, Calif. :  Camegie Commission 
on Higher Education. 
Nelson, Richard R., Sidney Winter, and H. L. Schuette. 1976. Technical changes in 
an evolutionary economy. Quarterly Journal of  Economics 90:90-118. 
Oi, Walter Y.  1971. A Disneyland dilemma: Two-part tariffs for a Mickey Mouse 
monopoly. Quarterly Journal of  Economics 85:77-96. 
Posner, Richard A. 1976. Antitrust law: An economic perspective. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Putka, Gary. 1989. Do colleges collude on financial aid? The Wall Street Journal, 
May 2, B1. 
20:55-76. 37  The University in the Marketplace 
Radner, Roy, and Leonard S. Miller. 1975. Demand and supply in United States higher 
education. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Rosovsky, Henry.  1990. The university: An owner’s manual. New York: W.  W.  Nor- 
ton. 
Roth, Alvin E. 1984. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and resi- 
dents: A case study in game theory. Journal ofPolitica1 Economy 92:991-1016. 
Roth, Alvin E., and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor.  1990. Two-sided matching: A 
study in  game theoretic modeling and analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph E. Stiglitz.  1976. Equilibrium in competitive insur- 
ance markets: An essay on the economics of  imperfect information. Quarterly Jour- 
nal of Economics 90:629-50. 
Salop, Steven C., and Lawrence J. White.  1991. Antitrust goes to college. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 5: 193-202. 
Spence, A. Michael.  1974. Market signaling: Information transfer in hiring and re- 
lated screening processes. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Spencer, Leslie. 1991a. College education without the frills. Forbes, May 27,290-94. 
. 1991b. The perils of socialized higher education. Forbes, May 27,294-304. 
. 1991c. Good school story. Forbes, May 27,304-6. 
Spies, Richard R. 1990. The effect of rising costs on college choice: The third in a 
series of studies on this subject. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University. 
Stocking, George W., and Willard F. Mueller. 1955. The cellophane case and the new 
competition. American Economic Review 4529-63. 
U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, Na- 
tional Center for Education Statistics.  1991. Digest of  education statistics,  1990. 
Washington D.C. : National Center for Education Statistics. 
Wilson, Charles,  1977. A model of insurance markets with incomplete information. 
Journal of Economic Theory 16: 167-207. 
Winter, Sidney G. 1971. Satisficing, selection, and the innovating remnant. Quarterly 
Journal of  Economics 85:237-61. 
Comment  Martin Feldstein 
This is an excellent paper, interesting both for the answers that it provides and 
for the additional questions that it raises but leaves unanswered. It is an im- 
portant paper because it looks beyond the previous  studies of  demand and 
costs to try to understand the structure of the market within which institutions 
of higher education operate. 
The authors recognize that almost all colleges and universities are nonprofit 
institutions and then proceed to ask why in so many cases these institutions 
do not behave as we might expect for-profit  institutions to behave.  Before 
discussing some of  the specific topics raised by Rothschild and White, I will 
offer my own general point of view on this subject. 
Martin Feldstein is  the George F.  Baker Professor of  Economics at Harvard University and 
president of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 38  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
I believe  that two facts provide the key to understanding the behavior of 
institutions of higher education  and of  the higher education marketplace in 
general. First, private colleges and universities  and prospective entrants into 
the market must compete with state institutions. State universities,  colleges, 
junior colleges,  and specialized institutions are subsidized by  state govern- 
ments in a way that permits them to offer every type of  education at much 
lower  prices  than  even  well-endowed  private  institutions can.  Why  states 
choose to act in this way rather than to provide funds to students and allow 
them to purchase services in the market (as states do for health care through 
the Medicaid program) is an interesting question in itself but one that I will 
not discuss here. 
The second principal fact is that, because private colleges and universities 
are nonprofit  institutions,  those  persons  in positions of  authority generally 
have little incentive to make the kinds of unpleasant decisions and unpopular 
changes that would be required in a for-profit context. This lack of incentive 
is reinforced by a traditional lack of power of university administrators. Col- 
leges and universities  are not hierarchical institutions like business corpora- 
tions, in which the chief executive officer can make major decisions on busi- 
ness policy, personnel,  and the like. Instead there is a tradition that requires 
the president and other key university officials to consult faculties and alumni 
representatives before making major changes in the structure of the university 
or its operating policies. 
This lack of power and lack of  incentive reinforce each other. Corporate 
chief executive officers could decide to sell a major portion of the company, to 
change the product mix, to change the pricing policy, or to make other such 
fundamental shifts. They might discuss these plans with key senior corporate 
officers or with the board of  directors, but in the end everyone recognizes that 
the CEO has the authority to make the decision. The president of a university 
or the dean of a faculty does not have the same authority. It is hard to imagine 
a university president announcing a unilateral  decision to eliminate the biol- 
ogy department, to acquire another college to be operated as a branch, or to 
double tuition. 
Any major decision within a university can only be reached after long and 
often  painful  confrontation  and  negotiation.  Such tough  decisions  may  be 
made when the institution faces very serious financial problems and is threat- 
ened with the possibility of bankruptcy.  But as a general matter,  university 
officials lack the incentive to make such tough and confrontational decisions 
in order to reduce costs or increase surplus. 
There is an interesting analogy to managerial behavior after leveraged buy- 
outs in private shareholder-owned corporations. Although the management of 
a large for-profit company is supposed to be motivated to make decisions that 
will increase long-term profits, it is often reported that management behavior 
changes substantially after a leveraged buyout puts managers in the position 39  The University in the Marketplace 
of owners. They are then much more aggressive about cost reductions, includ- 
ing eliminating  levels  of  middle  management  and making  other unpopular 
changes. 
If  corporate  manager-owners  are at  one  extreme of  the  power-incentive 
spectrum, university administrators are at the opposite extreme. Lacking the 
power to make changes without painful confrontation and lacking the personal 
incentive to overcome  that obstacle,  administrators  are likely to prefer the 
status quo and to avoid initiatives that would make their institution different 
from others.  Many  specific features of college and university  behavior  can 
therefore only be explained in terms of the history of higher education in the 
United States rather than with a model of profit maximization or cost minimi- 
zation. 
To those who would insist that the only satisfactory form of explanation is 
a model of maximizing behavior, I offer the following formal reinterpretation 
of what I have been saying: Decision makers in universities and colleges are 
(of  course)  utility  maximizers  whose  personal  utility  is a function of  such 
things as compensation, the pleasantness of their day-to-day work experience, 
the satisfaction of  doing their job well,  and the prestige of  their positions. 
They know moreover that their future employment prospects (salary, position, 
etc.) depend on their current performance and reputation. Seeking to achieve 
in the institution a major change that runs counter to existing practice at that 
and other institutions might increase the “satisfaction of doing the job well,” 
but it would not increase salary. It would create confrontations that reduce the 
pleasantness of the daily work experience, and it might create a reputation for 
being disruptive that would hurt the individual’s future job prospects at that or 
other institutions. In such a situation, the utility maximizer generally does not 
make major changes in the status quo or seek to depart from general practice 
among similar institutions. 
The competition from heavily subsidized state institutions prevents the en- 
try of for-profit institutions that could create a different style of management 
based on different incentives and different authority. Consider now how this 
perspective helps to answer some of the apparent puzzles raised by Rothschild 
and White. 
The Lack of  For-Profit Institutions of Higher Education 
Rothschild and White suggest that for-profit educational institutions do not 
exist because  students cannot borrow adequately against the human  capital 
that will be created. That is not convincing, since parents now pay as much as 
$80,000 for four years of undergraduate education at private institutions. A 
more plausible answer is that they are willing to pay those fees because of the 
reputation and presumed exclusiveness of  the private colleges and universi- 
ties. A new for-profit institution would be unlikely to develop the reputation 
required to overcome the very subsidized tuition at public institutions. 40  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
Input Policy 
In looking at inputs,  Rothschild and White ask why research universities 
have been so reluctant to establish job categories for outstanding teachers or 
to use new video technology to increase the efficiency of  teaching. I would 
add another “puzzle.” 
Colleges and universities do not permit faculty members to teach regularly 
at other institutions-even  during the hours that they are permitted to engage 
in outside activities, even for “noncompeting” institutions. Why, for example, 
does Yale not permit a faculty member to spend a few hours per week teaching 
a regular course at the University  of Bridgeport  (to use the institution  that 
Rothschild  and White cite as one that does not compete with Yale  for stu- 
dents)? The professor might augment his or her income by 20 percent or more, 
students (and possibly faculty) at Bridgeport would benefit, and the professor 
would be diverting no more time from Yale  duties than  would be  spent in 
consulting, editing, or textbook writing. There is nothing inherently unprofes- 
sional about such behavior, since physicians frequently work at more than one 
hospital. A for-profit university might permit such outside activities as a way 
of increasing a faculty member’s income with little or no extra effort or might 
even organize such an outside market for its faculty members’ services. 
Any such change would antagonize a considerable number of faculty mem- 
bers, who might worry that this would eventually lead to lower salaries as it 
becomes expected that faculty members will do such outside teaching.  The 
academic profession as a whole would frown on such an innovation as poten- 
tially reducing the total demand for faculty members. Students and alumni of 
Yale would fear that the Yale education would no longer be seen as unique. 
The same considerations relate to the increased use of video recording  that 
Rothschild and White mention. A dean or provost who contemplated organiz- 
ing the  Yale  “faculty  timesharing  service” to offer Yale  faculty  services to 
neighboring institutions would probably be more impressed by the confronta- 
tions that lie ahead than by the potential gains if he succeeded. With no market 
competition to force the change and no incentive for personal gain to make 
the university administrator accept the pain of making the change, the status 
quo continues. 
Pricing and Output Mix 
Or consider the Rothschild-White puzzle that universities charge the same 
amount per course (or at least per point of academic credit) regardless of the 
marginal cost of producing that bit of educational service and of the pattern of 
demand elasticities. There is of  course a problem of defining the relevant mar- 
ginal cost. An additional student can enter a large lecture at no extra cost in 
terms of instruction and without imposing any adverse externalities on other 
students in the course. The only additional resource requirement may be the 
cost of grading or perhaps of a small fraction of  a graduate student teaching 41  The University in the Marketplace 
assistant. Taken literally, the marginal cost is so close to zero that a two-part 
tariff pricing system of the type suggested by Rothschild-White would degen- 
erate into the existing flat fee. 
A looser and perhaps better definition  of marginal cost would regard the 
course rather than the student as the unit to be evaluated. Thus a small class of 
10 taught by a professor would be deemed to have 20 times the marginal cost 
per student in a class with 200 students, at least if the professor’s salary does 
not have to be increased for teaching large classes. 
But assuming that this problem of defining marginal cost is overcome, con- 
sider the effect of  introducing a new schedule of tuition charges that reflects 
the fact that the marginal cost of a large lecture course in economics or history 
is lower than  a small class in French drama or Irish poetry. Many students 
might decide that the extra cost of the more obscure courses was not worth 
paying. They would flock to the large low-cost  lectures. As the specialized 
courses shrink, their price would rise, accelerating this adjustment. This move 
to take advantage of economies of scale while still providing the specialized 
products when there is sufficient market demand is just what we as economists 
like to see happen  in  other  industries.  We might have  certain reservations 
about the narrowing of  undergraduate education or the lack of in-depth spe- 
cialization and of faculty-student contact, but even this might be overcome by 
requiring  students to take a certain  number of  small specialized courses in 
order to receive a degree. 
Yet  think of the transition problem from the point of  view of  the dean or 
university  president.  The  faculty  members  whose  courses  are  no  longer 
wanted  cannot  be  discharged  because  of  tenure  commitments.  Early- 
retirement incentives and other policies might help to eliminate these quasi- 
fixed costs, but the faculty would be unhappy, other educational institutions 
would be critical, some students would object to the higher cost of the courses 
that they had planned to take, and so on. Even if a new variable-price tuition 
system with  adequate educational safeguards could be designed that would 
make the university more efficient, the time and pain of the transition make it 
easy to understand  why an administrator with no personal financial incentive 
would be loath to try. 
Market Failures 
Rothschild and White discuss (section 1.3) whether a competitive alloca- 
tion is efficient. They reach the conclusion that, although one cannot be cer- 
tain, there are “weaknesses in the a priori argument that competition will al- 
locate  students to colleges efficiently.” Nevertheless,  when they discuss the 
specific issue of collusion in the setting of  scholarships and tuitions (section 
1.4),  they conclude that the “case for a market failure does not appear to be 
strong.” 
I agree with that conclusion.  More generally, while I have no doubt that 
there are market failures that would cause a theoretical purist to reject a decen- 42  Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White 
tralized system of education in favor of government regulation or private col- 
lusion, 1 think it is important to recognize the imperfections of the government 
system and the failure of nonprofit institutions to act optimally. Certainly, the 
experience around the world in a variety of other fields is causing governments 
everywhere to reduce regulations and to privatize previously  state-owned or 
state-subsidized institutions. 
Future Research 
Making the best use of our higher education resources is important not only 
because of the volume of inputs in this industry but, even more significantly, 
because of the contribution of higher education to aggregate economic growth 
and the level of individual economic success. Research on the economics of 
the higher education  industry is also something that we as university-based 
economists are particularly  well  suited to do. We  start with  a much  better 
understanding of the institutions of this industry than of other manufacturing 
and  service industries.  I hope that the fascinating paper by Rothschild  and 
White and, more generally, this volume will stimulate substantial research on 
the important issues in the economics of higher education. 